USA v. Daniel Siddons by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-5-2011 
USA v. Daniel Siddons 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Daniel Siddons" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 297. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/297 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-1350 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL R. SIDDONS, 
                               Appellant 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. No. 07-cr-00717-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 5, 2011) 
____________ 
 
 
Todd E. Henry, Esq. 
22nd Floor 
1500 Walnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19102-0000 
 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
 2 
 
Mary A. Futcher, Esq.   
Ashley K. Lunkenheimer, Esq. 
Office of United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street 
Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
Counsel for Appellee 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
 Daniel Siddons pled guilty to a 34-count indictment 
charging him with various types of fraud.  Prior to sentencing, 
Siddons moved to withdraw his guilty plea, a motion the 
District Court denied.  At sentencing, the Court imposed 
certain enhancements and varied upward from the 
recommended Sentencing Guidelines range.  Siddons now 
appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 
as well as the imposition of the sentencing enhancements and 
the upward variance.  We will affirm.        
 
I. Background 
 Siddons was a licensed financial adviser working at the 
investment arm of Mellon Bank (later Citizens Bank), and 
then at Wachovia Securities.  His job involved advising 
clients about purchasing investment products, and many of his 
clients were elderly customers seeking to invest their 
retirement savings.  On November 15, 2007, a grand jury 
indicted Siddons, charging him with nine counts of mail 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, five counts of wire 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one count of bank 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344.  A superseding 
indictment was later returned charging thirty-four counts of 
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mail, wire, and bank fraud.  The Government alleged that 
Siddons solicited his bank clients to invest in speculative real 
estate transactions that he controlled and that were unrelated 
to bank products, an illegal practice in the securities industry 
known as “selling away.”  Some of his clients invested their 
modest life savings with Siddons, initially believing that they 
were investing in a bank-supported, conservative investment 
product.  The Government accused Siddons of collecting 
$1.55 million between October 2002 and January 2006.          
 
 On February 3, 2009, while he was out on bail, 
Siddons requested that the District Court appoint him a new 
attorney; the Court denied his request.  On March 3, 2009, 
one week prior to trial, the Court held a change of plea 
hearing after Siddons indicated that he wished to plead guilty.  
During the plea colloquy, Siddons stated that he was not 
satisfied with his attorney, and the Court called a halt to the 
plea proceedings.  The Government’s motion to revoke bail 
was then addressed, with the Court hearing sworn testimony 
from Siddons and remanding him after finding that he had 
contacted witnesses.  Before the Court entered the remand 
order, Siddons stated that he wished to plead guilty to one 
count, and the Court recessed for Siddons to consult with his 
attorney.  Following the recess, Siddons stated, upon repeated 
questioning by the Court, that he was “unequivocally” 
satisfied with his attorney, Supp. App. at 118, and he 
thereafter pled guilty to all counts of the indictment without a 
written plea agreement.     
 
 On July 15, 2009, Siddons, represented by new 
counsel, filed a motion to withdraw the plea.  The District 
Court held a hearing, and Siddons and his father, who had 
been present at the meeting during the recess on March 3, 
2009, testified that Siddons’ prior attorney was unprepared to 
go to trial and had browbeaten Siddons into pleading guilty.  
That attorney and his associate testified and challenged 
Siddons’ testimony.  The Court stated that it did not believe 
Siddons, that the Government would be prejudiced by a 
withdrawal of the plea, and that Siddons had not adequately 
supported his claim of innocence.  The motion was denied.   
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 Siddons’ Presentence Investigation Report listed a 
Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months.  The range included a 
four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1(b)(16)(A) (2008) because the offense involved a 
violation of securities law and Siddons was a financial 
adviser.  The District Court imposed a two-level enhancement 
for obstruction of justice because it found that Siddons 
provided materially false information to the Court during his 
testimony at the hearing on the motion for new counsel and at 
the hearing to withdraw his guilty plea.  It also found that he 
obstructed justice by contacting witnesses.  With the 
enhancements, the final Guidelines range was 135 to 168 
months.  After reviewing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the 
Court varied upward and imposed a sentence of 180 months 
on each count, to be served concurrently, as well as $1.3 
million in restitution.   
 
 Siddons appeals the District Court’s (1) denial of his 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea; (2) imposition of the four-
level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A); (3) imposition of 
the two-level obstruction of justice enhancement; and (4) 
upward variance to 180 months.           
 
II. Discussion1
 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.  United States 
v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1986).  We review a 
district court’s factual findings regarding adjustments to the 
Guidelines range for clear error, and we review the court’s 
“legal interpretation and application of the sentencing 
guidelines under a plenary standard.”  United States v. Powell, 
113 F.3d 464, 467 (3d Cir. 1997).  Finally, we review the 
reasonableness of the ultimate sentence for abuse of 
discretion.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007).         
 
 
 
                                                 
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742.   
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 A.  Withdrawal of the Guilty Plea 
 A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea bears a 
substantial burden of “showing a ‘fair and just reason’ for the 
withdrawal of his plea.”  United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 
139 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)).  
Accordingly, “[a] shift in defense tactics, a change of mind, or 
the fear of punishment are not adequate reasons to impose on 
the government the expense, difficulty, and risk of trying a 
defendant who has already acknowledged his guilt by leading 
guilty.”  United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 
2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  When 
determining whether a defendant has shown a “fair and just 
reason” for withdrawing a plea, a district court must consider 
whether: “(1) the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the 
defendant proffered strong reasons justifying the withdrawal; 
and (3) the government would be prejudiced by the 
withdrawal.”  King, 604 F.3d at 139 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “Assertions of innocence must be buttressed by 
facts in the record that support a claimed defense.”  United 
States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation 
and quotation marks omitted).  Further, a defendant must also 
“give sufficient reasons to explain why contradictory 
positions were taken before the district court.”  Jones, 336 
F.3d at 253 (citation and quotation marks omitted).   
 
 Siddons argues that his “fair and just reason” for 
seeking to withdraw his guilty plea was that at the time of his 
plea, his attorney was unprepared to go to trial and pressured 
him into pleading.  Siddons’ appeal on this issue fails for at 
least three reasons.  First, while he states that he is innocent, 
he does not, as required, cite to any record evidence that 
would support his claim of innocence or sufficiently explain 
the contradictory position he took during the plea colloquy.  
Second, the District Court correctly found that the 
Government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of the 
plea.  Many of the Government witnesses were elderly, and 
there was a real risk that key witnesses would pass away or 
memories would fail prior to trial; indeed, at least four victims 
had died between the time of the defendant’s fraud and the 
time of his motion to withdraw the plea.  Reopening the case 
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would delay the trial and increase the likelihood that other 
witnesses would be unable to testify on behalf of the 
Government.  Finally, as the Court found after the hearing on 
the motion to withdraw the plea, Siddons’ attorney was 
prepared to try the case had Siddons not pled guilty on March 
3, 2009.  Accordingly, there was no “fair and just reason” 
justifying the withdrawal of the plea.       
 
B.  The Four-Level Investment Adviser  
Enhancement 
 
 A defendant’s Guidelines range is to be increased by 
four levels if the offense involved  
 
a violation of securities law and, at the time of 
the offense, the defendant was (i) an officer or a 
director of a publicly traded company; (ii) a 
registered broker or dealer, or a person 
associated with a broker or dealer; or (iii) an 
investment adviser, or a person associated with 
an investment adviser. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) (2008).2
 The District Court applied this provision.  Siddons 
argues, however, that (1) he was not technically an investment 
adviser
     
3
                                                 
2 The current Guidelines Manual recodifies this provision at § 
2B1.1(b)(17)(A). 
 in March 2003, the time that the indictment sets as 
the earliest offense date for the wire fraud counts; and (2) the 
§ 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) enhancement did not exist at the time that 
3 The Guidelines use the definition of “investment adviser” 
listed at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11), which states, in relevant 
part, that investment adviser “means any person who, for 
compensation, engages in the business of advising others, 
either directly or through publications or writings, as to the 
value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, 
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation 
and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates 
analyses or reports concerning securities.”      
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he was an investment adviser, so it is an ex post facto 
violation to apply it to him.    
 
 With reference to his first argument, Siddons began 
“selling away” in 2002, while employed as a financial adviser 
at Wachovia Securities.  When Wachovia found out, Siddons 
resigned under threat of termination on January 23, 2003.  
The pertinent indictment against Siddons alleges that he 
committed instances of wire fraud, at the earliest, on March 3, 
2003, after his resignation from Wachovia.  The enhancement 
under § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) still applies, however, because, as 
the Government states, “[t]he determination of loss and other 
factors pertinent to a fraudulent scheme is never confined to 
the date of the charged mailing or wiring, but always 
encompasses all relevant conduct that was ‘part of the same 
course of conduct or common scheme or plan.’”  Appellee’s 
Br. at 78 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2)); see also United 
States v. Stephens, 198 F.3d 389, 390-91 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(permitting consideration of uncharged conduct beyond 
statute of limitations for purposes of Guidelines determination 
in fraud case).  Accordingly, because Siddons was an 
“investment adviser” when he began fraudulently obtaining 
the victims’ money, the enhancement in § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) 
applies.      
 
 Siddons’ ex post facto claim requires somewhat deeper 
analysis. 4
                                                 
4 In brief, “[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution 
prohibits application of a law enacted after the date of the 
offense that inflicts a greater punishment[] than the law 
annexed to the crime when committed.”  United States v. 
Pennavaria, 445 F.3d 720, 723 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  The principles of the 
clause relate to the “core due process concepts of notice, 
foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to fair warning as 
those concepts bear on the constitutionality of attaching 
criminal penalties to what previously had been innocent 
conduct.”  Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).  “The 
ex post facto inquiry has two prongs: (1) whether there was a 
change in the law or policy which has been given 
  In most situations, “a court must use only one 
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version of the Guidelines under the ‘one book rule,’ and must 
apply that version in its entirety.”  United States v. Mills, 613 
F.3d 1070, 1072 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.11(b)(2)).  The Guidelines state that “[t]he court shall use 
the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant 
is sentenced.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a).  However, if the court 
determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the 
sentencing date would violate the ex post facto clause, “the 
court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date 
that the offense of conviction was committed.”  Id. § 
1B1.11(b)(1); see also United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 
193 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 
 Importantly, however, the Guidelines also instruct that 
“[i]f the defendant is convicted of two offenses, the first 
committed before, and the second after, a revised edition of 
the Guidelines Manual became effective, the revised edition 
of the Guidelines Manual is to be applied to both offenses.”  
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(3).  Siddons argues that because the 
enhancement contained in § 2B1.1(B)(16)(A) did not exist 
until November 1, 2003, after he was no longer an investment 
adviser, it was a violation of the ex post facto clause when the 
District Court applied the enhancement from the 2008 
Manual, rather than using the 2002 Manual without the 
enhancement.  The Government contends that there was no ex 
post facto violation because the Sentencing Guidelines’ 
“grouping” provision for continuing crimes (U.S.S.G. § 
3D1.2(d)), combined with the one-book rule and § 
1B1.11(b)(3), put Siddons on notice that he would be 
sentenced for fraud under the later-enacted Guidelines 
Manual.     
 
 We have held that courts may use the later-enacted 
Guidelines Manual for sentencing “straddle” crimes—
continuing offenses that started before an intervening change 
in the Guidelines but that ended afterward.  See United States 
                                                                                                             
retrospective effect, and (2) whether the offender was 
disadvantaged by the change.”  Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 
775, 784 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  The only issue in this appeal is the first prong. 
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v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 198 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A]pplication 
of the November 2000 Sentencing Guidelines would still not 
violate the ex post facto clause if the fraud continued after the 
effective date of the amendment.”); United States v. Moscony, 
927 F.2d 742, 754 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Rosa, 891 
F.2d 1063, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1989).  The crime here, wire 
fraud, is not technically a straddle crime because mail and 
wire fraud are not continuing offenses but, rather, are crimes 
that are complete upon the execution of each mailing or 
wiring.  See United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1425 
(3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute for other reasons as 
stated in United States v. Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 624 (3d Cir. 
1995).   
 
 The Government argues, however, that in cases of a 
continuing course of wire fraud, “the guideline calculation for 
a fraud offense is based on the entirety of the conduct during 
the scheme,” and thus “it is appropriate to apply the guideline 
manual in effect at the time the fraud ended, on the theory that 
the defendant was fully on notice as he continued his conduct 
of the enhanced penalty.”  Appellee’s Br. at 82.  The 
Government relies on the “grouping” provision of U.S.S.G. § 
3D1.2, which states that “[w]hen the offense level is 
determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or 
loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some other 
measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is 
ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is 
written to cover such behavior,” then “[a]ll counts involving 
substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a 
single Group.”  U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.2(d), 3D1.2.  Because, the 
argument goes, the District Court correctly relied on § 
3D1.2(d) to group the thirty-four related counts of conviction 
for purposes of determining the offense level, see PSR ¶ 86, 
the Court appropriately applied “the final applicable manual 
to the entire sum of the wrongdoing.”  Appellee’s Br. at 85.   
 
 The majority of Courts of Appeals that have decided 
the issue have held that use of the later-enacted Guidelines 
Manual in such circumstances is not an ex post facto violation 
because § 3D1.2, in combination with the one-book rule, 
gives notice to the defendant that his or her offenses may be 
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grouped for sentencing purposes and that the later-enacted 
Manual will apply.  In United States v. Vivit, 214 F.3d 908 
(7th Cir. 2000), for instance, the defendant was convicted of 
numerous counts of mail fraud involving false claims to 
insurance companies.  Certain mailings involved minors, but 
those mailings occurred prior to the enactment of a two-point 
enhancement for use of a minor.  Id. at 916-17.  Other 
mailings that led to counts of conviction occurred after the 
enactment of the enhancement, but the district court applied 
the enhancement after grouping the convictions pursuant to § 
3D1.2(d).  The Seventh Circuit stated  
 
that the relevant inquiry becomes whether the 
grouping rules give the defendant fair notice at 
the time a crime is consummated that the 
commission of further crimes subject to 
grouping would subject the defendant to 
sentencing under revised Guidelines.  The 
grouping rules, enacted in 1987, provide 
warning to criminals that completing another 
criminal offense similar to one committed 
previously places them in peril of sentencing 
under a revised version of the Guidelines.  The 
introductory commentary to the grouping rules 
explains that because the offense guideline for 
fraud, § 2F1.1, “deal[s] with repetitive or 
ongoing behavior,” multiple fraud convictions 
are appropriately grouped when the convictions 
involve substantially the same harm.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 3D introductory commentary.  We 
believe that this conclusion reflects the intent of 
the Sentencing Commission to provide notice to 
criminals that engaging in ongoing fraudulent 
behavior involving the same type of harm risks 
grouping of convictions, which because of the 
one-book rule, will all be sentenced according 
to the Guidelines in effect when the latest 
conduct occurred. 
 
Id. at 919 (emphasis added).   
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 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that there was no 
ex post facto violation by virtue of the district court’s decision 
to apply the “use of minors” enhancement to all of the 
grouped offenses.  Similar reasoning has prevailed in the 
majority of Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue.  
See United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 626-28 (2d Cir. 
2010); United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 
2008); United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1262-63 
(10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 893-
95 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 
1404-07 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cooper, 35 F.3d 
1248, 1250-53 (8th Cir. 1994), vacated, 514 U.S. 1094 
(1995), reinstated, 63 F.3d 761, 762 (8th Cir. 1995) (per 
curiam);5
 
 but see United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 546-
47 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding an ex post facto violation and 
requiring the district court to sentence the defendant under 
different Guidelines Manuals depending upon the date of the 
completion of the charged conduct in a multiple-count 
indictment).  
 Similarly, our decision in United States v. Bertoli, 40 
F.3d 1384 (3d Cir. 1994), does not mandate a finding of an ex 
post facto violation.  There, we held that where the district 
court grouped discrete acts of obstruction of justice for 
sentencing purposes, it was error to use a Guidelines Manual 
containing an enhancement enacted after the completion of 
some of the relevant conduct.  Id. at 1401-04; id. at 1404 
(“The fact that various counts of an indictment are grouped 
cannot override ex post facto concerns.”).  In Bertoli, 
however, we did not address the grouping provision at issue 
here, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), the provision we discussed above.  
Indeed, in Bertoli, there was no indication as to why the 
district court grouped the disparate conduct, but it could not 
                                                 
5At least one circuit has found no ex post facto violation in 
similar circumstances based only on the fact that § 
1B1.11(b)(3) gave fair warning to the defendant that the later-
enacted Guidelines Manual would be used; the court did not 
address grouping, even though the crimes involved repeated 
commission of the same offenses.  See United States v. Lewis, 
235 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2000).   
 12 
have been for the reasons stated in § 3D1.2(d) because the 
government itself acknowledged that grouping was improper.  
See id. at 1403 n.16 (“On appeal, the government does not 
endorse the district court’s decision to combine Counts Three 
and Six for the purpose of determining which Manual applies. 
Rather, the government’s sole argument is that the 1989 
Manual is not more favorable to Bertoli than the 1993 
Manual.”).”  Unlike Siddons’ actions, which involved 
ongoing, connected fraudulent conduct occurring both before 
and after the enactment of the sentencing enhancement, the 
defendant’s actions in Bertoli involved discrete, unconnected 
acts.  We agree with those Courts of Appeals that have found 
no ex post facto violation when a court groups continuing, 
related conduct and applies the Guidelines Manual in effect 
during the latest-concluded conduct.  This is so because the 
grouping provisions, combined with the one-book rule, place 
a defendant on notice that a court will sentence him or her 
under the Guidelines Manual in effect during the commission 
of his or her last offense in a series of continuous, related 
offenses.  
 
 Applying this analysis to Siddons, the District Court 
did not err in using the 2008 Guidelines Manual with the four-
level enhancement at § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A).  Siddons was an 
investment adviser when he initiated the fraud that led to his 
convictions.  Even though he was no longer an investment 
adviser as of the date of the first offense or at the time of the 
enactment of the enhancement, a court considers his “relevant 
conduct” as an investment adviser in determining his 
Guidelines range.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2).  Due to the 
grouping rules at § 3D1.2(d) and the one-book rule at § 
1B1.11, Siddons was on constructive notice that the 
November 1, 2003 enhancement could apply to his entire 
scheme, should he continue the conduct after the date of 
enactment.  As the Eighth Circuit aptly stated, “it was not the 
amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines that disadvantaged 
[Siddons], it was his election to continue his criminal activity 
[after the effective date of the enhancements].”  Cooper, 35 
F.3d at 1250.  There was no ex post facto violation here.   
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 C.  The Obstruction of Justice Enhancement 
 The District Court imposed a two-level enhancement 
based on § 3C1.1, which states 
 
[i]f (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or 
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the 
administration of justice with respect to the 
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 
instant offense of conviction, and (B) the 
obstructive conduct related to (i) the 
defendant’s offense of conviction and any 
relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related 
offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 
 The District Court found that Siddons had (1) lied 
about his reasons for wanting to change counsel and the 
nature of his dispute with his original counsel; (2) lied under 
oath when he attempted to withdraw his plea and explain his 
reasons for pleading guilty; and (3) attempted to unlawfully 
influence the testimony of witnesses and then lied about the 
reasons behind his behavior.  The application notes to the 
Guidelines support all of the Court’s reasons for imposing the 
enhancement.  See U.S.S.G. §§ 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(a) (attempting 
to unlawfully influence a witness), cmt. n.4(f) (providing 
materially false information to a judge).   
 
 Siddons challenges the District Court’s credibility 
determination, arguing that the Court misinterpreted his 
testimony on all fronts, and that he did not believe that he was 
violating the terms of his bail when he contacted witnesses.  
We will not disturb a sentencing court’s factual findings 
unless, on review of the entire evidence, we are “left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.”  United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 215 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  Having 
reviewed the transcripts of the various hearings, we cannot 
say that the Court committed error, much less that we have a 
definite and firm conviction there was error.                
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D.  The Reasonableness of the Sentence 
 Finally, Siddons argues that the District Court 
unreasonably applied the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and that 
his 180-month sentence was unduly punitive and greater than 
necessary.  He contends that the only reason that he received 
such a high, above-Guidelines sentence was because he aired 
his grievances about his attorney with the Court, and the 
Court held the failure of that relationship against him at 
sentencing.   
 
 The record does not support Siddons’ arguments.  The 
District Court stated that it was imposing an above-Guidelines 
sentence because of the nature of Siddons’ crimes against 
elderly investors and the “abhorrent nature” of the crimes, 
Supp. App. at 514; because of his abuse of his position as a 
financial adviser; and because the Court found that he 
“appears to have absolutely [no] compunction about lying, 
lying under oath.  He appears to have no conscience.”  Id. at 
510.  The Court concluded, with reference to the “no 
conscience” component, that “the public does, indeed, need 
protection from the defendant” as “he would be likely to 
repeat his crimes if he were at liberty or to commit criminal 
acts if he were at liberty.”  Id.  The Court acted well within its 
discretion when it varied upward in sentencing Siddons.  The 
reasons it gave are persuasive and fully supported by the 
record.   
 
 Siddons does not argue that the District Court 
committed any procedural error.  Under our “highly 
deferential” standard of review of a sentencing court’s 
decisions, we are to affirm a court’s procedurally sound 
sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. 
Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  Given the record before us, we 
simply cannot find that no reasonable court would have 
imposed a sentence one year longer than the highest 
Guidelines range.    
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III. Conclusion 
 We will affirm the judgment of sentence.   
 
